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Telling Lies and Selling Truth 
Hollis Huston 
The theatre is philosophical, and it is a philosophy. If we artists of the 
theatre don't know this, we don't know what we're doing. To conceal this truth 
is to repress our own power, and deliver ourselves into the hands of diverse 
enemies. Who is fooled except ourselves? We are accused throughout history 
of being mere rhetoricians, and of making the worse appear the better cause. 
Wickedness, after all, sells tickets, and good news gets bad ratings. Our 
enemies, therefore, try to speak for philosophy and against its enemies, as if 
we were not members of the philosophical commonwealth, and as if they were 
not merely envious colleagues. 
To say that the theatre is philosophical is to say something about its 
geography: on what continent of thought may it be discovered? To say that 
the theatre is a philosophy is to say something about its politics: with what 
nations of thought does it dispute that ground, and for what? To understand 
either claim, we must become philosophical, for to speak of philosophy, of 
what it may and may not do, of what may or may not comprise its walking 
tours, is itself a philosophical enterprise. There is no real danger for theatre 
artists in this activity, though Plato pronounced exile upon us; for the war 
between philosophers and poets, already old when Plato enlisted in it, is 
misnamed. There is a war, but it is among philosophers. The Platonists are 
the political arm of the royalist faction, and their cause depends on exclusivity: 
only they are to be called philosophers, lest the king should be forced to stand 
for election. They have revoked the credentials of their rivals not for any 
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failure as philosophers, but for their success. The idealists didn't want to 
compete with them. 
Keep your eyes on the form, and hang the content! the theatre is 
philosophical and is a philosophy, but not when it speaks philosophy; for what 
it is and what it says are two different things. Philosophy spoken by characters 
is poor philosophy, and suspect as theatre. Not even Shakespeare's characters 
believe the royalist politics they speak, left over as they are from John of 
Salisbury some three centuries before; O'Neill's paraphrase of Freud has the 
clink of cocktail shakers about it; Sartre's disquisition lacks the force of 
lonesco's enactment; and it is not discussion which is philosophical in the 
theatre, but action. 
In what realm of philosophy does the theatre lie? Ontology? a good 
guess: for the theatre is usually taken to represent something: it is not what 
it represents, but perhaps what it represents is. A theatrical convention, like 
a language, is intended to resemble the structure of existence. It is a machine 
for generating conceivable imagery. We are supposed to know that what we 
seem to see in the playhouse does not exist, but we are also supposed to be 
affected by the resemblance between what we see and something else we do 
not see. Not everything that can be described in a playhouse is true—and a 
play, by definition, is false-but any successful representation is a plausible, 
well-formed image. Fasten your eyes to form, and refuse the seduction of 
content. None of the particular imaginary places depicted by the stage are in 
question here, but rather its surmise on what kinds of place can be depicted. 
Since the theatre can never coincide with truth, however, it is at least one 
step removed from ontology. It is meant to resemble truth in its significant 
aspect, but can never be true; a theatrical convention, therefore, is an educated 
guess as to what kind of thing truth might be if we stumbled over it in the 
dark. We are, of course, in the dark—we shall never see but darkly, through 
the glass. The stage, therefore, is a credentialing procedure for knowledge, 
which we need because we shall never see face to face. On stage, we know 
that the Ding-an-sich will never make an entrance; we work purely with the 
objects of perception, which were made in order to be perceived. A theatre, 
therefore, is perhaps a model of knowledge or, to speak philosophically, an 
epistemology. It does not tell us what we know, but it shows us what kinds of 
things could be known if they were true. 
When two cultures develop conflicting theatrical conventions, their 
imageries declare war on each other. Different model, different episteme. 
The conflict is not merely artistic, but philosophical; not merely philosophical, 
but political. If we ignore the philosophy implicit in theatrical conventions, we 
are susceptible to confusions about the theatres which use them, and the 
societies which invent theatres. 
Example: the classical and neo-classic ideas of unity, as they are played 
out in dramatic and theatrical convention, describe not merely different truths 
but different criteria of truth. The difference is all the more poignant for 
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being accidental: the Italians thought they were following Aristotle precisely 
where they most essentially transgressed against him. In both epistemologies 
unity signifies truth. For Aristotle, an incoherent image could not be 
philosophical, and therefore could not take aim at the regular motions that 
flow beneath shifting surfaces; for the Renaissance, and incoherent image 
would be an offensive reminder of the medieval barbarism that separated them 
from the wisdom of the ancient world. The great difference is hidden by a 
common word--"unity." The word has references that are continents apart. 
Only by looking at the practice of two different philosophies do we see their 
mutual hostility. Aristotle and Castelvetro, side by side, strain the world 
through their sieves, retaining "unified" things in their exemplary collections, 
and allowing incoherent things to wash through. But their exemplary 
collections are totally different! They have retained, from the same sample, 
different objects! The difference is in their sieves: the holes have different 
shapes. 
For the Greek, unity is a sensation, naively recognizable by the senses. 
The unified and therefore beautiful object must have "a certain order in its 
arrangement of parts," and "a certain definite magnitude."1 The required order 
is nothing arcane, but a rule of thumb that anyone can apply: the "several 
incidents" must be "so closely connected that the transposai or withdrawal of 
any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole,"2 which is only to say that 
when you've taken away everything you can, what's left is unified. The proper 
magnitude is known by the naked eye: a thing is big enough if it can "be taken 
in by the eye," both in its whole and, from the same point of view, in its parts. 
A "very minute creature" does not show its parts at a glance, while a "creature 
of vast size" does not reveal its whole to the eye, therefore neither aspect is 
unified, or beautiful. Translating his spatial intuition into the dramatic 
dimension of time, Aristotle therefore said that a plot "must be of some length, 
but of a length to be taken in by the memory."3 In other words, the unified 
work defines a moment~a self-enclosed nugget of time. Nothing technical 
here: the distinctions are of quality rather than quantity. No special status, 
expertise, or equipment is needed to make such distinctions. Unity is to be 
sensed, not measured. 
"Till the epoch of Pericles, the time of day was estimated merely by the 
length of shadow," writes Spengler of Classical culture, "there was no exact 
subdivision of the day."4 Theatrical unity exists in time, and to describe a 
temporal unity is to beg questions of time itself: what do we know about time? 
how do we know it? The Renaissance mind was suspicious of naively sensed 
time, which would not answer its questions. The Italian critics, in their 
prescriptions for literature, were performing a rationalization (read "math-
ematization") of space and time. The age that would soon measure accelera-
tion was devising, in its practice of representation, the mental software which 
could describe such investigation. Modern physics was born in the description 
of changes in velocity, in the graphic representation of distance as a function 
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of time. Time, therefore, was to be made quantifiable, continuous, and 
infinitely divisible. There are no bumps, no nuggets, no moments, in the time 
of classical physics. The time of Scaliger and Castelvetro is clock-time. 
It is crucial, though often difficult, to remember that not all time is clock-
time. As David Landes, the historian of clocks has put it, "it is not 'natural' to 
want to know the precise time."5 The very notion of a "precise" time is an 
insult to the senses, for sensuous time is always accurate enough for any 
sensuous concern. Sensuous time may conflict with clock-time, but there can 
be no inaccurate sensation of time. If I wake, it's time to get up. If I yawn, 
it's too long. 
Unity was for Aristotle a naive sensation (It's cold! Wear your wind-
breaker). But for literary critics of the Renaissance, such an important concept 
could never be naive (Is it cold? Check the thermometer). They were 
members of an elite with a grudge against popular culture, and anyone who 
saw things naively was in their view unqualified to look at all. 
For Aristotle, unity is unified: it is plot, the soul of the drama. But the 
unity of Scaliger and Castelvetro is fractured into three parts. Unity of action, 
which Aristotle spoke of at great length, doesn't interest them because it can't 
be quantified. But time and place, to members of an intellectual vanguard 
dedicated to the mathematization of space/time, call for isolation and 
subjection to measure. 
The Greek's almost casual observation that tragedies "keep as far as 
possible within a single circuit of the sun,"6 looked to Castelvetro like a 
proscriptive mathematical limit, a limit that on the one hand requires a 
scientific explanation, and which on the other hand acquires from that 
explanation the force of absolute natural law. "The time spent in performance 
is the same as the time spent in the actions themselves;" therefore plays cannot 
"represent more events than those which occurred in the space of time 
required by these plays," nor can artists make spectators believe "that many 
days and nights have passed when the sensibly know that only a few hours have 
elapsed."7 Scaliger, in like mind, complains that Aeschylus "has Agamemnon 
killed and buried so suddenly that the actor has scarcely time to breathe."8 
Clock-time didn't exist in Aristotle's world. An "hour" was an inexact 
concept in a world that told time by the sun, for the length of each day on the 
sundial is different. To measure small units of time, or measure events by 
reference to them, would have been in his world both impossible and 
scientifically useless. Time, for Aristotle, is sensuous time, inseparable from 
his unified theory of beauty, i.e., unity. The Italians, by their division of his 
theory into quantifiable components, show themselves to be of another age and 
another epistemology; we know that their space/time was different from Greek 
space/time because they describe different ways of coming to know about it. 
Classical dimensions are made up of distinct moments; neo-classical dimen-
sions are continuous, calibrated, and infinitely divisible. 
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It is clear, therefore, that epistemologies are at stake in theatrical 
conventions. Yet the idea of the actor is dubious, and therefore we may ask 
if the theatre's aspiration to epistemology is legitimate. For what the stage 
presents to us is not knowledge, but something that seems like knowledge. 
Erving Goffman: "Whatever it is that generates sureness is precisely what will 
be employed by those who want to mislead us."9 We succeed in the theatre by 
seeming like truth rather than by being true. Hamlet called this seeming 
"monstrous," and William B. Worthen has traced this monstrosity through 
Elizabethan acting, comparing it to the modern anxiety about performing and 
becoming. In the Tudor period, "the actor's art coordinates two sharply 
divergent world views and sparks a bitter clash between the 'puritan' distaste 
for theatrical artifice . . . and a 'neoplatonic' sensibility that values all acts of 
creation as potentially godlike."10 There's a sin in acting, but where is it? in 
seeming what we are not, like Webster's Duke Ferdinand, or in failing to seem 
what we cannot be, like that rogue and peasant slave Hamlet? Stanislavsky, 
instead of justifying play, turned modern actors against acting and toward a 
tortured construction of inner integrity; for him the actor's sin, his "decline in 
to the inartistic and inauthentic," is "a slide into mere 'acting' instead of 
creative 'being.'"11 
If only being is creative, the theatre was doomed before it began. What 
is damnable about acting is that it displays the form of being and takes it in 
vain: how do we know it as the form of being? because it lacks the substance. 
If the mind entertains it, it is entertained falsely; and that is the peculiar truth 
of acting. 
Is the theatre, therefore, a model of knowledge, or a model of know-
ledge's appearance? Perhaps a theatrical convention's import is neither 
ontology nor epistemology—perhaps it is the design of a magic lantern rather 
than a theory of light. Perhaps the theatre is phenomenology, and every 
convention an experiment that throws up appearances before our eyes like 
charming quarks. It's not easy to describe phenomena. Different experiment, 
different quarks. They're all real, but what do they really mean? Theatre is 
the rhetoric of imagery, not its logic; but the rhetoric of imagery is phenomen-
ology, that branch of philosophy that Kant led us to. 
Recall the Tudor painting on the ancient Round Table. King Arthur 
welcomes Galahad. But the servant who fills the plate before his king is half 
as tall as his master: the perspective is that of social class, of place in the 
divinely ordered scale of rank. The place in which king and subject intersect 
is hardly depicted at all, a mere frame in which the Round Table hangs like a 
decorative wreath. This approach to a romance shares the architectural 
method of the Corpus Christi plays, in which all scales of time and space are 
adjusted sensuously, to the measure of human concern: we can be simul-
taneously far enough away to take in the temple, close enough to see Simeon 
bless the babe. Pascal's anguish before the immensity of the universe is 
inconceivable in such a world; his pain is modern, and can arise only from the 
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contemplation of mathematized space/time, in which we cannot see at the 
same time both ourselves and the world. 
On the other hand, in Serlio's city street which recedes towards an arch 
that frames a distant vista, it is the points of space itself which are or-
chestrated; God's ordination has been wreaked on space and time, which 
vanish in a vortex just behind the most distant obelisk. No people-this is a 
stage set which has not yet learned to embrace the actor, whose body dwarfing 
the triumphal arch at the fifth groove would have exposed the art of perspec-
tive as a mere philosophy, linear phenomenology. The stage is set for 
exploration, for physics, for economics, for anguish. 
The subject fields of philosophy are not philosophically neutral. Ontology, 
epistemology, phenomenology: each presupposes that there is a particular 
question. Each question undermines and supplants the last one. Epistemology 
critiques ontology, phenomenology critiques epistemology. What is? how do 
you know? what does knowledge look like? You can't get to the first question 
directly; the last will be first. And the last first question is theatrical. 
So if every theatrical convention encodes a phenomenology, then all 
theatres agree on certain philosophical attitudes. Beneath any particular 
recipes for the generation of phenomena, all theatres agree that phenomena 
intervene between us and things, and that phenomena can be intentionally 
generated where there are not things to back them up. That's what actors do: 
as father's shade appears to Hamlet with compelling force, an actor makes the 
Dane appear to us, though the Prince of Denmark never will arrive. If this 
charade were Hamlet, 'twould be no actor.' 
A great vaudevillian said that the main thing is honesty-if you can learn 
to fake that, you've got it made. In this fallen world, truth and a buck gets you 
a cup of coffee. To take effect, truth must project itself, and we poor forked 
creatures must put on makeup if we hope to be believed. Because every 
credential is an invitation to fraud, and the skill that makes truth heard can 
also project a lie, we sometimes think it blasphemous to act the role of truth; 
but sometimes we think it sinful to leave truth out of the play. 
Yet anxiety about the theatre, and the problem which it poses, are not 
theatrical, but arise at those moments when we look at the theatre from 
outside, bearing the arms of a hostile philosophy. The theatre is not merely 
philosophical, it is in itself a philosophy. As long as we are in the theatre, 
truth does not intrude from outside to compete. Theatrical truth lives in the 
theatre, and looks tawdry only when we emerge into the daylight outside the 
playhouse; the philosopher should remember that there are some playhouses 
we never leave, from whose stalls the truth must have a certain look. 
Perhaps there is a truth that is one and unchanging, though as an actor 
I doubt it. For the truth that holds you and me together across the dotted line 
is protean, many and mutable. I am what I am now in order for you to see me 
that way; you look because I have chosen the right look. But on the stage, no 
idea will last, and what was right just now is now wrong, even in the time it has 
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taken for me to tell you-I must transform myself, make a transition, become 
something else to keep the curtain from coming down, to keep that ripe 
tomato in your pocket and out of my face. Now I have changed, and what I 
present to you now has no link to what I showed before, but you will supply 
that link, the empty spot in my performance, and call it character. In Plato's 
terms, there may or may not be a sun, but the shadows in the cave have 
intelligence. Brecht: "The coherence of the character is in fact shown by the 
way its individual qualities contradict one another."12 
The theatre is at least Kantian, in that it criticizes metaphysics. As long 
as we are in the playhouse, the Ding-an-sich can never appear to embarrass 
our imagery. More than that, it criticizes positivism and the myth of 
observation. Performance is our daily reminder that sight is a business 
transaction; not that we decide what to see, for there is, after all, a performer 
on the other side of this contract, but that we have agreed to see it, and what 
we see was offered with an eye to making us agree. What we see is created 
by and for our sight. Our sight causes it to be, and its being (like the fire-
eater in a market-place) causes us to see. There is no criticism of this contract 
except to break it. 
Acting favors becoming over being, mutability over constancy, transforma-
tion over process, change over stillness, time over space, The theatre is 
aristotelian rather than platonic, not only in that it is made out of actions 
rather than qualities, but in that it insists that the ideas of things, if we are to 
quiz them, must be in the perceivable world. 
The answer, says the Platonist, is obvious. When we break the contract, 
leave the playhouse, climb out of the cave, we see things as they are. But 
modern politics suggests that we have only entered a larger playhouse, whose 
exits are not so clearly marked. Shall we gouge out our eyes, and smash the 
electronic ones? Even Descartes, who tried to sweep the table clean, found 
himself in a theatre, where the malignant demon might present false images. 
Until we learn where the exits are, the theatre will be a prolegomena to any 
future politics. We must know how to he before we can know how to sell the 
truth. 
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